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Claims about needs are a ubiquitous feature of everyday practical discourse. It is therefore 
unsurprising that needs have long been a topic of interest in moral philosophy, applied ethics, 
and political philosophy. Philosophers have devoted much time and energy to developing 
theories of the nature of human needs and the like.1 
 Philosophers working on needs are typically committed to the following claims: 
 
(1) There are different kinds of needs.  
(2) Within the different kinds of needs is a privileged class of needs that is especially 
normatively significant. 
 
Some philosophers go further and make rather grand claims about needs. They claim that 
needs are central or fundamental to moral thinking and that we must have a needs-centred 
moral theory or a general reorientation of moral philosophy around needs. They thus subscribe to: 
 
(3) This privileged class of needs is fundamental, irreducible and morally important, in 
a way that has an important upshot for moral philosophy and/or moral thought.  
 
(I give more precise statements of these in the next section). Let me use these formulations to 
distinguish two different positions that one could take about needs. Holding (1) and (2) makes 
																																																								
1 Needs are also a central issue in other disciplines, including development studies, 
psychology, economics (particularly issues of healthcare resource allocation). 
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one a moderate needs theorist. Holding all three claims makes one an ambitious needs theorist.  
 In this paper I aim to do two things. First, to show how applying recent work on modal 
terms can help us to understand thought and talk about needs. This yields a better 
understanding of what people have commonly referred to as different ‘kinds of needs’ and an 
improved ability to interpret and assess claims (1) and (2). This is the positive part. I then use 
these ideas to cast doubt on (3) and ambitious needs theory. Put briefly, a proper 
understanding of claims about needs undermines the idea that the concept of needs is 
fundamental in moral thought or in moral philosophy. Ambitious needs theory fails. 
 The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. In section 2 I trace the standard moves 
made in philosophical discussion of needs and outline in more detail what the moderate and 
the ambitious needs theorists hold. I also briefly explain why we might find the standard 
picture unsatisfactory in various ways. In the next section (§3) I show how recent work on 
‘ought’ and ‘must’ is relevant to the task of understanding needs talk and outline a package of 
claims which I call needs claims as modal claims (NCAMC). I then (§4) assess needs theory in light 
of NCAMC, concluding that it vindicates some aspects of moderate needs theory but poses a 
threat to ambitious needs theory, particularly if we think of the relevant class of needs claims as 
claims of moral necessity. In section 5 I consider an alternate proposal, that needs-discourse 
should be interpreted in terms of prudential necessity and I examine some candidate accounts of 
prudential necessity on behalf of the needs theorist. I argue that one cluster of these – analysing 
prudential necessity in terms of harm – is plausible and that the truth of it (or anything like it) 






§2 The standard story of needs 
Philosophical discussion of needs typically begins with a pair of cases such as:  
 
(i) Hillary needs water.  
(ii) Hillary needs 2,383 delegates to win the nomination. 
 
Such a pair is used to support the idea that there is an important difference between (i) and 
(ii) and between claims of their respective types more generally. Very roughly, the standard 
story is that claims like (i) are normative, or important, whilst claims like (ii) are in some way 
secondary or less significant. Different terms are used to label this purported distinction 
between claims like (i) and (ii). These include: ‘Absolute vs Instrumental needs’; 
‘Fundamental vs Instrumental needs’; ‘Non-Contingent vs Contingent needs’.2  
When it comes to the question of what appears on each side of the distinction (i.e. 
what we are distinguishing between) different philosophers provide different answers. In some 
places the claim is that there are multiple types of needs. 
 
Contingent needs are requirements for contingent ends, which the needing being might 
or might not have [...] Non-contingent needs, by contrast, are necessary conditions for 
non-contingent aims that the needing being could not but have (like life).3  
 
A definition of ‘need’ requires a distinction […] between fundamental and 
instrumental needs[.]4 																																																								
2 Absolute vs Instrumental [McLeod (2014), Wiggins & Dermen (1987)], Fundamental vs 
Instrumental [Thomson (2005)], Non-Contingent vs Contingent [Reader & Brock (2004), 
Schuppert (2013)]. These categorizations are contentious in many ways. They are also far 
from clearly equivalent. However, that is not important for my purposes.  
3 Reader & Brock (2004: 252). 
4 Thomson (2005: 175). 
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Sometimes the claim is that there are multiple concepts of need.  
 
A conceptual distinction between instrumental needs and absolute needs can be drawn[.]5  
 
Sometimes the claim is that there are multiple senses of ‘need’.   
 
[A]lthough there is an instrumental sense of ‘need’ where we can ask for some purpose to 
be specified in a non-elliptical version of the ‘needs’ claim and there are no limits on 
what this purpose is (except the limits of what can be of any conceivable concern to 
anyone), there is another sense of ‘need’ by which the purpose is already fixed, and fixed 
in virtue of the meaning of the word…We have then to assign at least two senses to 
‘need’ if we are to assign the right significance to the sorts of thing people use the word 
to say and to understand the special argumentative force of needs claims.6   
 
With these ideas on the table, philosophers of need then try to find the grounds of that 
distinction. By this I mean they look for precisely what absolute / fundamental / non-
contingent / basic needs (henceforth ‘the privileged class of needs’) have in common that 
makes them special, in contrast with the merely instrumental needs.  
The literature on needs manifests disagreement on what precisely makes the 
privileged class of needs special. However, there is a widespread but implicit agreement that 
what makes them special is a connection to some particular state or property. There is also a 
clustering around a small number of closely-related proposals for what that single state or 
property might be, namely: flourishing, survival, the preservation of agency, avoidance of 
harm, or avoidance of serious harm: 
																																																								
5 McLeod (2014: 293). 
6 Wiggins (1987: 9). 
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To say that it needs that environment is not to say, e.g., that you want it to have that 
environment, but that it won’t flourish unless it has it.7 
 
The mark of the moral importance of non-contingent needs in ethics is that the 
needing being simply cannot go on unless its need is met. It is no exaggeration to say 
that in a state of non-contingent need, the very existence of the needing being as we know it is 
at stake.8 
 
Needs, in the relevant sense, are those items or conditions that it is necessary for a 
person to have if she is to avoid being harmed.9 
 
To claim that X is needed instrumentally is simply to assert that X is a necessary 
condition for the obtaining of the contextually relevant goal, whatever that happens 
to be. […] In contrast, to claim that X is a fundamental need for person A is to assert 
that X is a non-derivative, non-circumstantially specific and an inescapable necessary 
condition in order for the person A not to undergo serious harm.10 
 
Thus goes the standard dialectic in philosophical discussion of needs. We can restate this 
standard story as the following set of claims, acceptance of which makes one a moderate needs 
theorist: 
(1) There are different kinds of needs / concepts of needs / senses of ‘need’.  
(2) Within this plurality is a privileged class of needs that is especially significant and 
significant in virtue of its connection to one particular state or property. 
 
 As mentioned above, some philosophers go further and adopt a form of ambitious needs 																																																								
7 Anscombe (1958: 6). 
8 Reader & Brock (2004: 252). This view is also proposed by Richards (1970: 37) ‘[T]he 
notion of a need is relative to some view of what is required for the survival and/or minimal 
functioning of some other things’.  
9 Miller (2007: 3). Miller (1976: 130) proposes the same view in earlier work ‘‘A needs X’ = 
‘A will suffer harm if he lacks X’.’ This view is also defended by Feinberg (1973: 111). 
10 Thomson (2005: 175). 
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theory. Gillian Brock & Soran Reader give the clearest expressions of ambitious needs theory. 
In a series of papers they write: 
[T]he central place of needs in our moral lives has tended to go unnoticed. More 
attention should be paid by moral philosophers to the role that the concept of need 
can and should play in moral theory […] [G]rasp of the notion of need is essential to 
any understanding of what the moral life is about. In simple contexts the dominant theories 
cannot adequately capture the moral significance of needs.11 
 
Value-based, rule-based and character-based theories have to make use of the 
concept of need as fundamental, irreducible and morally important, if they are to account 
for the simple needs-meeting moral contexts that are the bread and butter of 
everyday moral life. Needs-talk cannot be eliminated, nor reduced to talk of values, rules or 
virtues.12 
 
Those who ignore the concept of need must think either that needs are not morally 
important, or that anything morally important about need can be captured by other 
concepts. We think this is a mistake. We think the concept of need should be as central in moral 
theory as actual needs are in moral practice.13 
 
David Wiggins suggests a similar view in entitling one of his papers on needs ‘an idea we 
cannot do without’.14  
 As I read them, ambitious needs theorists are committed to two claims. They are 
committed to a normative claim; needs have fundamental moral significance. They are also 
committed to a claim about the concept of needs, that needs facts and needs claims are 
irreducible, they cannot be given a reductive analysis. Let me now provide a statement of what 																																																								
11 Brock & Reader (2002). My italics. 
12 Reader & Brock (2004). My italics.  
13 Reader & Brock (2004). My italics. 
14 Wiggins (1987). 
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the ambitious needs theorist claims (one slightly more detailed than that given above): 
 
(3) This privileged class of needs is morally fundamental and conceptually irreducible, 
in a way that has an important upshot for moral philosophy and/or moral thought.  
 
There are many features of the standard story, or particular ways in which it is developed, that 
we might want to question.  
 Against (2), we might find it implausible that the privileged class of needs are exclusively 
connected to one particular state. And even if we were convinced of this, we might doubt that 
the relevant state is ensuring literal survival (which seems to set the bar too low) or, conversely, 
the preservation of flourishing (which seems to set the bar too high). We might also baulk at 
the idea that the privileged class of needs have to do with the aims or ends of the needing being 
– as is sometimes suggested – given that it seems undeniable that newborn infants need 
nourishment and yet do not have aims or ends (even non-contingent ones).15 
 We might also worry about the coherence of the package of claims offered by the 
ambitious needs theorist. This is because some of the ways that (2) could be true would seem 
to undermine (3). For example, if the privileged class of needs claims are claims about what is 
necessary for (e.g.) the avoidance of harm then this seems to undermine the idea that needs are 
of fundamental moral significance. It also undermines the idea that the relevant concept plays 
an irreducible role in moral thought (I come back to these points in §§4-5). 
 Looking to (1), a familiar worry is that it is better not to postulate ambiguity or multiple 
concepts to account for diverse uses of the same word (at least other things equal). Such a 
move seems under-motivated by the relevant data, namely claims like (i) and (ii)). The 
																																																								
15  Plausibly, they need nourishment (in part) in order to develop the capacity for aims. 
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difference, such as there is, between (i) and (ii) does not look like a conceptual difference, there 
seems too much commonality between the two claims. It also seems implausible that ‘needs’ is 
used in two different senses in: 
 
(i) Hillary needs water.  
(ii) Hillary needs 2,383 delegates to win the nomination. 
 
 The similarity between (i) and (ii) seems utterly different from the kind of ambiguity exhibited 
by e.g. ‘Rahul is at the [river] bank’ and ‘Rahul is at the [financial] bank’. 
 This seeming lack of a conceptual difference is reinforced by the claims made by needs 
theorists in trying to distinguish the privileged class of needs from the merely instrumental 
ones. The common idea is that instrumental needs claims are claims about what is necessary for the 
obtaining of some goal whereas the privileged class of needs claims are claims about what is necessary 
for (e.g.) the avoidance of harm. But this does not look like a deep difference and certainly not a 
conceptual difference. Both are claims about what is necessary. The only difference is in 
whether the relevant state of affairs is (e.g.) the avoidance of harm or something else. But it is 
not at all clear that there is a difference in how ‘needs’ functions in (i) and (ii).16  
 A further worry about (1) and the general context in which it is motivated is that 
theorists working on needs have tended to focus on a restricted range of claims that are made 
using ‘needs’. When we look at the range of sentences that deploy ‘needs’ we find many claims 
about need do not obviously fit into the categorisations that are offered by needs theorists. 
Take these claims: 
 																																																								
16 On some understandings of needs the difference between (i) and (ii) disappears, when we 
fully spell out the claims. I do not mean to be ruling out that kind of view here. 
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(iii) Triangles need three sides. 
(iv) America needs campaign finance reform. 
(v) Blatter needs to be punished. 
  
These do not seem obviously to fit into the categorisations offered above. They seem neither 
instrumental nor from the privileged class. Yet, despite their difference from claims like (i) and 
(ii) it seems implausible to think that there is a semantic difference in ‘needs’ across the 
examples. 
 What we need is some way of recognising that claims like (i) and (ii), and other claims 
involving ‘needs’, can be different but without treating this as a matter of multiple senses of 
‘needs’ or multiple concepts. We need to recognise the diversity within needs-discourse whilst 
preserving what is unified across it. 
 Thankfully, there is an alternative, more unified, way of understanding need-claims like (i) 
and (ii). We reach this by taking some ideas from recent work on ‘ought’ and ‘must’ and 
applying them to needs-claims. The result is a better understanding of needs claims, one that 
we can then use to evaluate the prospects for moderate and ambitious needs theory. 
 
§3 From ‘Ought’ and ‘Must’ to ‘Needs’ 
Take the following set of sentences: 
 
a. Morally speaking, John [must/ought to] tell the truth. 
b. John [must/ought to] take more exercise. 
c. John thinks that he is Queen Elizabeth so he [must/ought to] think that he lives in 
Buckingham Palace. 
d. John [must/ought to] be here by 3pm given the quiet roads. 




For a long time, the standard response to sets of sentences like these was to postulate multiple 
senses of ‘ought’ and ‘must’, or multiple concepts, to account for the diversity exhibited by (a)–
(e).17 The work of Angelika Kratzer provides a way to resist that kind of view.18 Her pioneering 
work on modals shows how we can preserve a uniform semantics for modals like ‘must’ (and 
‘ought’) that is compatible with the differences in how they function in sentences (a)–(e). (From 
here, I leave aside ‘ought’ and focus on ‘must’.19)  
 ‘Must’ is used to make strong necessity claims. Simplifying a little, the Kratzerian analysis 
of such strong necessity claims is that they are claims about what is true in all of the 
possibilities consistent with the relevant law or standard (where this might be explicitly 
mentioned within the sentence itself, as in sentence (a), or contextually salient).20 To see how 
this works let us start with two example sentences. On the Kratzerian view, ‘Morally speaking, 
John must tell the truth’ expresses the proposition that in all possible worlds in which the moral 
standards are adhered to, John tells the truth.21 By contrast, ‘What goes up must come down’ 
expresses the proposition that in all worlds consistent with the laws of nature, objects that go up 																																																								
17 This issue has been discussed much more with respect to ‘ought’ than ‘must’. For 
discussion of ‘ought’ see Ewing (1953), Harman (1975), Parfit (2011). For prescient 
discussion see especially the exchange between Xenakis (1957) and Glassen (1960). One 
issue I leave aside here is the debate between those who think that there is ambiguity in 
‘ought’ between ‘agential’ and ‘evaluative’ ought claims. Discussing that would take me too 
far afield here. See e.g. Wedgwood (2006), Schroeder (2011), Chrisman (2012). 
18 Kratzer (1977). Also Wedgwood (2006), Dowell (2011), Finlay (2014), Chrisman (2015). 
19 I focus on ‘must’ because ‘needs’ is like ‘must’ in being a strong necessity modal and I want 
to sidestep (i) whether ‘ought’ is a strong necessity modal and (ii) how to understand weak 
necessity modals within the Kratzerian framework. 
20 One detail I omit, purely for simplicity, is the restriction on the set of possibilities (the 
‘modal base’). A more accurate statement would thus be that, on Kratzer’s view, strong 
necessity claims are claims about what is true in all of the relevant possibilities consistent with 
the relevant standard. Another detail I omit, again for simplicity, is that Kratzer’s analysis 
involves the idea of partial ordering. 
21 I follow Kratzer’s presentation in construing possibilities in terms of possible worlds. But 
the general approach does not depend on a commitment to possible worlds, only possibilities. 
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come down.  
 On this Kratzerian view, ‘must’ has the same meaning in (a)–(e). In each case it functions 
to generate a proposition about what is required by some law or standard (hereafter I will 
simply use ‘standard’, for brevity). The key difference between the sentences is a difference in 
the standard that is relevant. Returning to the set of sentences above, sentence (a) is a claim 
about what is required by the moral standard. Conversely (b) is a claim about what is required 
by the prudential standard. By contrast (c) uses the standard of rationality whilst (d) uses an 
evidential standard and (e) uses a general evaluative standard. 
 A nice feature of this view is the way that it combines unity with flexibility. Must-claims 
have a unified logical structure; we do not need to postulate different senses of ‘must’ to account 
for (a)-(e). At the same time it is flexible; one can plug in any arbitrary standard whatsoever and 
generate meaningful must-claims and without endorsing the relevant standard. For example, 
‘To uphold Bullingdon club tradition, he must [something horrible].’  
 My suggestion is that we take the Kratzerian story for ‘must’ and apply it to ‘needs’ 
claims.22 After all, ‘needs’ is a strong necessity modal, just like ‘must’.23 We see this from the 
similarity between these need-claims and the equivalent must-claims: 
 
• You should give it back. In fact you need to do so. 
• You should give it back. In fact you must do so. 
 
• He should give it back but you need to do so. 
• He should give it back but you must do so. 
																																																								
22 Philosophers working on modal language have seemed to neglect ‘needs’ discourse. One 
exception is Finlay (2016: 196) who briefly mentions ‘needs to’ as a normative verb.  
23 I am here talking of ‘needs’ as a verb, rather than as a noun. It is interesting that in English 




• I need to leave now. 
• I must leave now. 
 
There is also the general similarity between the need-claims we started with and the equivalent 
must claims: 
(i) Hillary needs water.  
(ii) Hillary needs 2,383 delegates to win the nomination.  
 
• Hillary must have water. 
• Hillary must have 2,383 delegates to win the nomination. 
 
Finally, there is the problematic nature of: 
• #Hillary must have water but she doesn’t need it. 
• #Hillary must have 2,383 delegates to win the nomination but she doesn’t need 
them. 24 
 
This makes it plausible that ‘needs’, like ‘must’, is used to make strong necessity claims, claims 
about what is required by a standard.25  
 Crucially, ‘needs’ is also used to make claims about different kinds of necessity. Take the 
following set of needs claims: 
 
(i) Hillary needs water. 
(ii) Hillary needs 2,383 delegates to win the nomination. 																																																								
24 One can get a reading of sentences like these which are not problematic. But that is only if 
the sentence makes claims about two different standards. For example, ‘Given that she has a 
well, Hillary must have water but she doesn’t need it’.  
25 There is also the fact that ‘need’ is used for the negation of ‘must’ claims (where ‘mustn’t’ 
would be incorrect) as in: “Must I?” “No you needn’t.” 
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(iii) Triangles need three sides. 
(iv) America needs campaign finance reform. 
(v) Blatter needs to be punished. 
(vi) Blatter needs a corkscrew to open that wine. 
 
Claim (ii) is a claim about what is necessary in order to win the nomination within the election 
rules. By contrast, (iii) is a claim about what is logically necessary. Claim (iv) is a claim about what 
is necessary according to an evaluative standard. Claim (v) is a claim about what is morally 
necessary.26 Claim (vi) is a claim about what is nomologically necessary.27 (I bracket for the 
moment the question of how to interpret claim (i) and come back to it later (§§4-5).) 
 One difference between ‘must’ and ‘needs’ is that ‘must’ is always an auxiliary verb 
whereas ‘needs’ can either be a regular verb or an auxiliary verb. This difference does not 
matter though. Even when ‘needs’ is a regular verb as in ‘Blatter needs a corkscrew to open 
that wine’ it is still used to make claims about what is necessary (it is just that it is used to make 
claims about what is necessary, relative to some kind of necessity, for some state of affairs to 
obtain). Thus ‘needs’ is like ‘must’ in being used to make strong necessity claims.28 
 Given this parallel between ‘must’ and ‘needs’, we should take the orthodox treatment of 
‘must’ claims and apply it to ‘needs’ claims. Remember that the Kratzerian analysis of strong 
necessity claims is that they are claims about what is true in all of the possible worlds consistent 
with some relevant standard. Applying this to needs claims we get the following picture: 
‘Hillary needs 2,383 delegates to win the nomination’ conveys the proposition that in all worlds 
where the election rules are adhered to and in which Hillary wins the nomination, she has 2,383 																																																								
26 Or legally necessary, depending on the context. 
27 Relative to strong background assumptions (e.g. no other way of opening the wine). 
28 Compare with ‘have’ which can function as a main verb, as in ‘I have flu’, or as an auxiliary 
verb, as in ‘I have to leave’. Here the difference matters a lot. There is no plausibility that the 
modal nature of ‘I have to [verb]’ claims carries over to ‘I have [noun]’. 
  
14 
delegates. By contrast, ‘Blatter needs to be punished’ conveys the proposition that Blatter is 
punished in all of the worlds consistent with the moral standard.  
 Let me briefly restate the package of claims I have argued for in this section, which I will 
refer to as ‘needs claims as modal claims’.  
 
Needs claims as modal claims (NCAMC) 
- Needs claims are necessity claims.  
- Needs claims are claims about what is true in all worlds where some standard is met 
or where some standard is met and some state of affairs obtains.29 
- Nothing in the meaning of ‘needs’ places a restriction on what the relevant standard is 
(or what the relevant state of affairs is). 
- The relevant standard can either be explicitly mentioned in the needs claim ‘To do the 
morally right thing, you need to give it back’ or recoverable from context ‘You need a 
passport to enter the country’ (on a sign at the airport immigration desk). 
 
One nice feature of NCAMC is that it provides a framework within which we can more clearly 
state and evaluate claims made about needs-claims. Let me start with two perennial debates 
within philosophy of needs. 
 First, there is a debate between those who think that all needs-claims are instrumental 
claims and those that deny this.30 Secondly, and relatedly, it is sometimes suggested that there is 
something about the grammatical form of claims like (i) that signals their distinctness from 
																																																								
29 This feature of the view has the consequence that there are lots of needs claims which are 
weird to assert but which are nonetheless true. These will be needs claims about anything 
that necessarily correlates with a true needs claim. The same applies to needs claims about 
necessary truths. For example, “Hillary needs 2+2=4” will come out as true.  
30 Flew (1981), White (1975: 107), Thomson (1987: 15). This is commonly discussed in 
connection with the proposal that all needs claims are really of the logical form ‘X needs Y 
in order to Z’. A similar view of must claims is defended by Finlay (2014). 
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claims like (ii).31 
 
(i) Hillary needs water. 
(ii) Hillary needs 2,383 delegates to win the nomination. 
 
Put another way, it is sometimes suggested (I think) that the grammatical form of (i) rather than 
(ii) makes clear that we are dealing with a need from the privileged class of needs rather than 
the less important ones. 
 We can interpret these two debates as debates about the following questions: (1) are all 
needs claims concerned with instrumental necessity? (2) On the assumption that the answer to 
(1) is ‘no’, does the grammatical form of a needs-claim determine the kind of necessity 
invoked?  
 As we see from the parallel between ‘needs’ and ‘must’ the answer to each of these 
questions is a resounding ‘no’. One cannot tell what kind of necessity is relevant simply from 
the grammatical form of a needs-claim. With (i), the relevant kind of necessity could be legal (a 
dystopian government requires citizens to carry water at all times) or prudential (Hillary is 
extremely dehydrated) or instrumental (it is time to water Hillary’s prize plants).32  
 It is readily apparent that whilst the relevant kind of necessity for needs claims is sometimes 
instrumental, as in ‘Blatter needs a corkscrew to open that wine’, the kind of necessity relevant 




31 To be clear, the second question presupposes that the answer to the first is ‘no’. 
32 White (1975: 105). 
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§4 Assessing Needs Theory in light of NCAMC 
I want to now use NCAMC to assess the prospects for moderate and ambitious needs theory. 
Remember the first three claims about needs I outlined earlier: 
 
(1) There are different kinds of needs / concepts of needs / senses of ‘need’.  
(2) Within this plurality is a privileged class of needs that is especially significant and 
significant in virtue of its connection to one particular state or property. 
(3) This privileged class of needs is fundamental, irreducible and morally important, in 
a way that has an important upshot for moral philosophy and/or moral thought.  
 
Let me start with (1). If NCAMC is correct then (1) comes out as true. Whilst we do not have 
different meanings of ‘needs’ or concept of need we do get different kinds of needs and, on 
one interpretation, different senses, as long as that is understood as the claim that different 
kinds of necessity can be relevant to a need-claim. 
 What about claim (2)? This comes out as partly true. Some needs claims are normatively 
significant. They are so because they invoke a form of necessity that is, itself, normative. So the 
difference between ‘Blatter needs to be punished’ and ‘Blatter needs a corkscrew to open that 
wine’ is that the first is about what is morally necessary whereas the second about what is 
instrumentally necessary, coupled with the fact that only the first kind of necessity is, itself, a 
normative kind of necessity.33 There are therefore some needs claims that are important in a 
way that is not common to all needs claims thus making (2) partly correct.   
 But what about the second element of (2), the idea that the normatively significant kind 
of needs are all connected to one particular state or property? NCAMC provides reasons to 
																																																								
33 Rest assured, I will get back to claims like ‘Hillary needs water’ shortly.  
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doubt this.34 It seems pretty clear that there are a plurality of properties or states that can be 
normatively significant and whose normative significance can be at issue when someone makes 
a need claim. Take this set of examples, ‘Hillary needs water’, ‘Blatter needs to be punished’, 
‘The patient’s wishes need to be respected’. These are all needs-claims that are plausibly 
normative but it seems implausible that they are all connected to some particular state or 
property. More generally the fact that we get normative needs claims whenever a claim is made 
using any kind of normative necessity gives us reason to doubt that there is one particular state 
or property that is relevant to all of the normative needs claims. NCAMC thus gives us reason 
to doubt the second part of needs theorist’s claim (2). 
 An important question is which kind or kinds of necessity are relevant to the privileged 
class of needs claims? The suggestion that I have implicitly relied upon in the previous 
paragraphs is that the relevant kind of necessity is moral necessity. This is a natural suggestion, 
given the aim of finding a form of necessity that is normative, in order to thereby underpin the 
distinction between different classes of needs claims such that some of them are distinctively 
significant. On such a view, the privileged class of needs claims are claims about what is morally 
necessary or required. If that is right then when ‘Hillary needs water’ is used to make a claim 
from the privileged class then this is because it is a claim about the moral necessity of Hillary’s 
having water.35  
 Notice though that this way of interpreting (1) and (2), where they come out as true and 
thus vindicating moderate needs theory, would straightforwardly refute (3) and ambitious needs 
theory. If the privileged class of needs claims just are claims about what is morally necessary 
then the claims within (3) – the normative claim and the conceptual-irreducibility claim – 
																																																								
34 But see §5. 
35 As opposed to e.g. an instrumental or legal claim. 
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would each be false. 
 On the normative claim, the privileged class of needs could not have fundamental, 
irreducible, moral significance if they are, themselves, facts about what is necessary according 
to morality. The ambitious needs theorist contends that needs are morally important in that 
they are things that generate moral demands and requirements. They thus supply justifications for 
moral demands or requirements, rather than themselves being moral requirements. This idea is 
implicit in much writing about needs but it is explicit in Brock & Reader who write: ‘[I]f we act 
to help somebody, and someone asks us to justify ourselves, the response ‘because she needed 
it’ can function as a sufficient justification. Needs figure in respectable explanations and 
justifications for our moral actions.’36 
 On the conceptual-irreducibility claim, if claims about the privileged class of needs are 
just claims about what is morally necessary or required then such needs claims would be 
straightforwardly reducible to claims about what is morally necessary, contra the conceptual 
claim of the ambitious needs theorist. 
 Here is a parallel to bring out the problem here for the ambitious needs theorist. Suppose 
that someone held the following views: (i) etiquette is morally fundamental and justificatory (ii) 
etiquette thought and talk is irreducible and (iii) that we should reorient moral thinking to take 
account of the fundamental importance of etiquette.  
 Imagine that, on further probing, it turned out that the requirements of etiquette just 
were the requirements of morality. Would this show etiquette to be fundamentally morally 
important? Would it show etiquette claims to be irreducible? Would it be compatible with the 
idea that we should reorient moral philosophy around it?  
 I take it that the answer to these questions is ‘no’. If it turned out that the requirements 																																																								
36 Brock & Reader (2002: 427).  
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of etiquette were identical to the requirements of morality then etiquette would not have 
fundamental moral significance. We would have guaranteed that claims about etiquette were 
normative claims but only in a way that precluded them from being fundamentally important to 
morality.37 Furthermore, on such a picture, facts about etiquette would themselves simply be 
strong moral necessity facts presented in a different vocabulary. It would be perfectly possible 
to restate claims about etiquette in other terms (namely moral terms). There would thus be no 
conceptual irreducibility. 
 If the kind of necessity relevant to the privileged set of needs claims is moral necessity 
then (3) is undermined. This suggests that the ambitious needs theorist should not take the 
privileged set of needs claims to be claims about moral necessity.  
 In fact, treating the privileged set of needs claims as concerning moral necessity is 
problematic apart from the poor fit between this view and ambitious needs theory. For it 
would seem to make such claims contingent on there being some agent for whom there is a 
moral necessity to alleviate the need. But what should we say about a situation where an 
unconscious person is (e.g.) severely dehydrated but no-one is in a position to provide them with 
water. The absence of a person who could have a duty or obligation (or even a reason) to 
provide the water would seem to force us to say that the person does not need water. But that 
seems clearly false. So anyone should be wary of treating the relevant kind of necessity as moral 
necessity.38 
																																																								
37 I am here relying on the distinction between morally significant facts (facts that generate 
moral reasons, requirements, permissions etc) and moral facts (facts about moral reasons, 
requirements, permissions etc).  
38 One might refine the proposal to avoid this counterexample. But any needs-as-moral-
necessities view is vulnerable to the following objection: if moral error theory were true then 
it would be true that we do not have moral duties, obligations, or reasons to alleviate peoples’ 
needs. But the truth of moral error theory would not show that people have no needs. If so, 
the relevant kind of needs cannot be so closely connected to moral necessity. 
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 If the ambitious needs theorist should not take the privileged set of needs claims to be 
claims about moral necessity then what kind of necessity should they think is the correct one? 
Presumably, they should instead think of them as claims about prudential necessity. They could 
then hold that facts about prudential necessity are morally relevant - they generate moral 
demands and requirements and morally justify actions. There would then be the question of 
whether such facts were reducible.  
 Before moving on to consider that suggestion let me pause to take stock and restate the 
dialectic. I am evaluating the needs theorists’ claims in light of NCAMC. I have shown that 
NCAMC provides an interpretation of (1) where it comes out true. There are different kinds of 
needs and different ‘senses’ of ‘needs’ inasmuch as there are different kinds of necessity that 
can be relevant to a claim about needs. I have also shown that NCAMC provides an 
interpretation of (2) where it comes out partly true. Some needs claims are normative because 
they are claims that invoke normative kinds of necessity, such as moral necessity. NCAMC is 
thus compatible with a form of moderate needs theory (as long as we drop the claim that the 
normative kinds of needs are all related to one state or property).  
 The issue that remains to be settled is whether NCAMC undermines ambitious needs 
theory. This is connected to the issue of whether the normative needs claims are always 
normative through a connection to moral necessity because, as argued above, if normative needs 
claims always invoke moral necessity then ambitious needs theory is undermined. The 
ambitious needs theorist thus needs some other kind of normative necessity to be relevant to 
the privileged class of needs claims. The proposal to be considered now is that the relevant 
form of necessity is prudential necessity.39 
																																																								
39 One might suggest instead that there is a neglected third alternative, such as teleological or 
biological necessity. I lack the space to consider that kind of view here.  
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§5 Prudential Necessity? 
The prospects for ambitious needs theory depends upon there being a prudential kind of 
necessity, one that can make the privileged class of needs claims morally fundamental and 
conceptually irreducible, in order to vindicate (3). You might think it was obvious all along that 
needs theorists were thinking of prudential necessity, given that claims like (i) seem to be (at 
least typically) prudential rather than moral. Such a view also coheres nicely with the proposals 
that philosophers have typically offered for what the privileged class of needs are connected to 
-- survival, preservation of agency, harm avoidance, serious harm avoidance – all of which are 
clearly connected to prudential value.40 
There are many ways of developing a view of prudential necessity and I lack the 
space here to either canvass a wide range or to argue in full for one particular view. In what 
follows I simply lay out and provide some examination of one cluster of views which is 
plausible. 
 One way of thinking about these suggestions is in terms of prudential thresholds. On 
such a view, needs claims are claims about what is prudentially necessary, and this is to be 
understood as what is necessary for an agent to avoid being below a prudential threshold. 
Thus ‘Hillary needs water’ would be the claim that in all the worlds where Hillary avoids 
falling below the prudential threshold she has water.41 
We need some more detail before we can examine the proposal. This is because we 
could think of the thresholds in different ways. A threshold could be a particular level of well-
being (as in the case of preservation of agency or some minimal level of well-being). On this 																																																								
40 On this point see Grix & McKibbin (2016). Survival is a tricky one. Failing to survive (at 
all) is not a way of falling below a well-being threshold (on the assumption that the non-
existent lack a level of well-being). 
41 More precisely, where ‘Hillary needs water’ is used to make a claim about prudential 
necessity. I omit this, and similar, qualifiers below in the interests of brevity. 
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view all of the privileged class of needs claims would concern falling below one particular 
threshold.  
Alternatively the threshold could be dependent upon the agent’s level of well-being. 
The relevant threshold in the case of avoiding harm is simply one’s current level of well-being. 
In the case of avoiding serious harm it is avoiding the level of well-being at least some 
particular magnitude below one’s level of well-being. 
Any needs theorist (be they moderate or ambitious) must answer the question of 
what the relevant prudential threshold is. Further, the ambitious needs theorist must do so in 
a way that does not undermine their wider view. Let us see some possible ways that they 
might proceed. 
Suppose, first, that the threshold is a particular threshold, one that holds for all agents 
at all times independently of context. This view seems vulnerable to the following complaint: 
there just is no plausible single candidate for the threshold that is the truth-maker of all of 
the relevant needs claims. Take the suggestion that one needs something just in case and 
because it keeps or places the agent above a minimal level of well-being, such as that 
necessary to preserve an agent’s agency or minimal functioning. That proposal seems 
vulnerable to cases like: 
 
Flourishing Felipe: Felipe is living a very flourishing life. He contracts an illness 
which, left untreated by transplant, would be severely detrimental to his life but 
would neither kill him nor remove his agency. He would simply have a lot less 
enjoyment, moderate pain for long periods, and reduced ability to pursue his goals 
and projects.  
 
Suppose Felipe claims ‘I need a transplant’. This seems like a claim from the privileged class 
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of needs claims. But, by stipulation, Felipe does not risk falling below the minimal threshold. 
His survival is not at stake nor are the preconditions of his agency. But this seems like a clear 
case a need. What Felipe says seems true. 
 Felipe is but one example. But the recipe for such cases is clear. Take someone 
whose well-being is at risk of being low or being severely reduced (but without falling below 
the relevant threshold) if they do not get something. On the fixed threshold view it cannot 
be true that they need to get that thing. But that seems implausible. We seem to make true 
claims about what is needed by agents who do not risk falling to such low levels of well-
being. What a needs theorist who advocates this proposal must come up with (at a 
minimum) is a plausible rationale for the threshold they defend.  
 A natural alternative is to hold the threshold is not fixed but is sensitive to the 
agent’s current level of well-being. This is true on each of the two harm suggestions. Take the 
avoiding serious harm suggestion first.42 This view treats the threshold as being determined by 
the agent’s current level of well-being but holds that the extent of the reduction in well-being 
must be greater than a certain (fixed) magnitude for the harm to count as serious (and thus 
for a claim from the privileged class of needs claims to be true). Such a view faces challenges. 
First, it needs to supply an explanation for what counts as a serious harm (and why).43 Second, 
it face cases very similar to the case of Felipe. Any well-being reduction that is short of the 
required magnitude to count as serious will preclude a true needs claim being made, in a way 
that seems counterintuitive.  
																																																								
42 Thomson (2005: 175) ‘one of the main features of the concept of a fundamental need is 
that it makes a virtue of natural necessity by cutting down options and, thereby, simplifying 
choice. One has no choice except having X or undergoing serious harm.’ 
43 The ambitious needs theorist needs the explanation of what constitutes a serious harm to 
avoid treating serious harm as being connected to what we have moral reasons to prevent (or 
any other claim about morality), on pain of circularity. 
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A more plausible contender is the idea that prudential necessity should be 
understood in terms of avoiding harm (simpliciter). On this view, ‘Hillary needs water’ 
expresses the proposition that in all the worlds where Hillary avoids harm she has water. 
This proposal has a number of apparent merits. First, it is supported by the 
plausibility of inferences from what we must have in order to avoid harm to what we need. 
That is, it seems right that any occasion in which someone will be harmed without X is one 
in which they need X. We can safely infer from ‘without X, S will be harmed’ to ‘S 
needs[prudential] X’.  
Second, the proposal makes good sense of the suggestions offered by needs theorists 
trying to develop accounts of the privileged class of needs. Even if some of the proposals 
identify something stronger than harm – such as conditions for flourishing, or the minimal 
conditions of agency, or avoidance of serious harm – they are all related to harm.  
Third, unlike the serious harm threshold suggestion, it shows why needs claims seems 
to be warranted even with respect to avoiding minor ailments (‘I have a headache, I need 
painkillers.’) Fourth, given the moral significance of harm it (like the other proposals 
considered above) explains why needs are normatively significant.  
Though I have pointed out some merits of the idea, I do not pretend to have 
provided a full assessment of the view that prudential necessity should be construed simply 
in terms of avoidance of harm.44 But suppose that this is the right way of construing prudential 
necessity and so understanding the privileged class of needs. What would be the upshot for 
the different kinds of need theorist? Let me restate once more the three claims about needs 
that are common to needs theorists: 
																																																								
44 One worry that I lack the space to take up is whether this proposal collapses the 
distinction between prudential necessity and instrumental necessity.  
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(1) There are different kinds of needs / concepts of needs / senses of ‘need’.  
(2) Within this plurality is a privileged class of needs that is especially significant and 
significant in virtue of its connection to one particular state or property. 
(3) This privileged class of needs is fundamental, irreducible and morally important, in 
a way that has an important upshot for moral philosophy and/or moral thought.  
 
Suppose the privileged class of needs claims are connected to prudential necessity and this is 
understood, in turn, in terms of the avoidance of harm. If this is right then (1) and (2) are 
secured. Good news for the moderate needs theorist. 
It looks like bad news for the ambitious needs theorist though. If the privileged set 
of needs claims are simply claims about what the agent must have in order to avoid harm 
then (3) is false and ambitious needs theory fails. This is because whilst we find that needs 
claims undoubtedly concern something morally significant – the avoidance of harm – this 
serves to undermines the suggestion that needs thought and talk is irreducible and 
fundamental in moral philosophy. Contra the ambitious needs theorist, needs discourse can 
be reduced, in particular to claims about the avoidance of harm. Reader & Brock are thus 
mistaken that: 
Value-based, rule-based and character-based theories have to make use of the 
concept of need as fundamental, irreducible and morally important, if they are to account 
for the simple needs-meeting moral contexts that are the bread and butter of 
everyday moral life. Needs-talk cannot be eliminated, nor reduced to talk of values, rules or 
virtues.45 
 
The relevant kind of needs talk is fully reducible to claims about the avoidance of harm. 
Whilst needs discourse is perfectly respectable – it embodies no error – it does not add to the 
																																																								
45 Reader & Brock (2004). My italics.  
  
26 
conceptual resources available in moral theorising or in everyday moral thought and talk. We 
don’t need needs-talk.46 
 
§6 Conclusion 
In this paper I have argued that we should interpret needs claims as modal claims and model 
them on the theory of how necessity claims, such as ought claims and must claims, are 
understood. Doing so highlights the commonalities and the differences between the various 
claims that we make using ‘needs’. I then used this model of needs-talk to assess moderate 
and ambitious needs theory.  
My main conclusion is that moderate needs theory is in good standing but that 
ambitious needs theory fails. It fails because even if we understand the privileged class of 
needs claims as being concerned with prudential necessity, this directly undermines the idea 
that the concept of needs is irreducible in moral thought and talk. There is nothing to be 
gained in moral thinking, or in moral philosophy, by thinking in terms of needs, rather than 
harm and well-being.47 48 
																																																								
46 Compare Bradley (2012) on ‘harm’.   
47 There may also be something to be lost by thinking in terms of needs. Perhaps thinking 
and talking in terms of needs allows us to slide between importantly distinct issues. 
48 For help with this paper I am immensely grateful to: Debbie Roberts, Connie Rosati, Brian 
Rabern, Bryan Pickel, Matthew Chrisman, Anders Schoubye, Steve Finlay, Mike Ridge, 
Christina Dineen, Mihaela Mihai, Mathias Thaler, Kieran Oberman, Luis Duarte D’Almeida, 
Mark Van Roojen, Brad Cokelet, Eric Wiland, audiences in Politics and in Philosophy at The 
University of Edinburgh, SPAWN (Syracuse) participants, and participants in the Arizona 
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